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This paper explores alternatives to the present system of rehabilitat 
ing or returning to work persons who are applicants for or beneficiaries 
of the disability programs of the Social Security Administration (SSA). 
The proposals are presented in two parts. Part I pertains to beneficiaries 
and is based on the benefit system as it currently exists. Part II pro 
poses changes in how the SSA determines eligibility for benefits.
The following assumptions and beliefs underlie the recommenda 
tions:
1. The current Return to Work (RTW) system in social security is 
functioning poorly, as evidenced by the low number of persons 
who leave the rolls for reasons other than death or transfer to the 
retirement system.
2. The SSA's role in the RTW process should be minimized in favor 
of allowing market forces to operate.
3. Private sector providers should be encouraged to enter the mar 
ket and to bear the associated risks, and they should be rewarded 
based on performance rather than on the costs of services pro 
vided.
The Existing Return-to-work Program
Under the current arrangements, SSA is supposed to advise appli 
cants about rehabilitation possibilities. Using SSA guidelines that may 
be adapted to state conditions, the state Disability Determination Ser 
vice (DDS) refers beneficiaries to the state vocational rehabilitation
331
332 Improving the Return to Work of Social Security Disability Beneficiaries
(VR) agency. The exact substance of this referral is not at all clear. The 
applicant may be informed of the existence of the VR program or may 
be given literature about it. 1 Apparently, in most SSA field offices, 
there is no concerted effort to inform applicants about what the pro 
gram might do for them or about the relationship between these ser 
vices and eligibility for the SSA benefits program. 2
The individual interested in rehabilitation must submit a formal 
application to the state VR agency with evidence of his/her physical or 
mental condition. The VR counselor will interview the applicant, per 
haps order further psychological or physical examinations, and decide 
whether the person should be accepted for services. If accepted, the cli 
ent works out an individual written rehabilitation plan (IWRP) with the 
counselor that sets forth the intended services and the objective of the 
program. 3
Under the usual VR rules, a client is considered rehabilitated if 
placed in a job or homemaker status for a period of two months. In 
order for the VR agency to be reimbursed by SSA for the costs of the 
services, it must meet a sterner test of rehabilitation. The beneficiary 
must be back at work earning more than the "substantial gainful activ 
ity" (SGA) level (currently $500 per month) for a period of at least 
nine months. If return to work for that period comes about, the VR 
agency is reimbursed for all reasonable expenses it incurred, subject to 
a maximum payment equivalent to the estimated savings to the SSA 
trust fund.
Using the traditional VR test, 40,155 beneficiaries were rehabili 
tated during fiscal year 1991, in the sense that they returned to work 
and remained at work for at least 60 days. 4 The average cost for their 
rehabilitation was about $3,600, more than $1,000 greater than the 
average cost for the nonbeneficiaries who were rehabilitated. The cost 
data are from the VR program and essentially represent purchased ser 
vices. VR overhead and staff salaries, including the cost of the VR 
counselors, are not included in the averages. 5
If the test is the one that SSA imposes before reimbursements are 
made, the number of rehabilitants decreases to a little more than 6,000 
per year. In fiscal year 1993, nearly 300,000 persons were referred to 
VR, and 6,154 were rehabilitated in the sense of having earned SGA or 
more for nine months. The rehabilitation total is a relatively small 
number, some one-half of 1 percent of the persons on the rolls.
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The appropriate comparison, however, is not with the number of 
persons on the rolls at a given time. It would be more meaningful to 
take a cohort of persons on the rolls and to follow this group through 
time to determine the number of individuals that return to work. Pre 
liminary data from the New Beneficiary Survey show that most per 
sons who leave the SSA rolls do so because they attain the age of 65 
and transfer to the old age program or because they die. Some small 
number of persons return to work. We have no information about the 
number who return to work after receiving RTW services and the num 
ber that return without them. It seems safe to say that 3 percent, not all 
of whom have received any RTW services return to work, which is 
hardly a large number (Hennessey and Dykacz 1992 and 1993). The 
objective of a RTW program should be to improve that percentage.
Overall, nearly $64.5 million was paid to VR in reimbursements in 
fiscal year 1993. However, it appears that the program was cost benefi 
cial from the point of view of the trust fund. The projected savings for 
fiscal year 1993 of $321.9 million was five times the amounts reim 
bursed.
Up until now, SSA's arrangements to reimburse providers have been 
with the joint federal-state VR program exclusively. In March 1994, 
SSA revised its regulations so as to allow the private sector to compete 
for the business. If the VR agency does not take on the case after a 
period of four months, the new policy will allow referral to alternative 
providers, including those from the private sector. This program is not 
yet in effect and awaits the issuance of detailed rules and regulations 
by SSA.
Allowing Market Forces to Operate
The limited effectiveness of the public VR system in taking persons 
off the rolls is not surprising. The VR programs have found other clien 
tele, as Congress has asked them to concentrate on the disadvantaged, 
the mentally ill, persons with mental retardation, and persons with 
severe disabilities (Jenkins, Patterson and Szymanski 1992). Persons 
receiving benefits may be considered as difficult to rehabilitate since 
return to work means the loss of benefits. The issue of the disincentives
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facing beneficiaries has to be faced squarely since it plays such an 
important role in return-to-work efforts.
We can consider a person who has recently been granted benefits. 
Obviously, that individual chose to apply for benefits and, with the 
award in hand, is now in an "equilibrium" position with no great incen 
tive to change by starting an RTW program. Yet, the whole rationale 
for the RTW programs is that, somehow, the person will be better off 
by using RTW services, getting a job, and giving up the benefits. There 
may be a bit of a contradiction in this situation: having "chosen" to be 
on the benefit rolls, how could a person be better off by using RTW 
services and eventually leaving the rolls?
Before dealing with that issue, it is important to recognize that the 
interests of the benefits-paying agency and the interests of the individ 
ual beneficiary may be different. SSA is providing benefits, and it 
would be worthwhile for the agency to spend an amount on RTW ser 
vices equal to what would be saved if the person left the rolls. The test 
for determining the amount is different, but would not the beneficiary 
be well advised to invest in RTW services so long as the cost is less 
than the net gain the person would enjoy by returning to work?
There are, however, two obvious sets of problems facing both the 
individual and the agency. One involves information. There simply is a 
great deal of uncertainty surrounding the efficacy of rehabilitation 
technology, the future labor market, and the success of RTW services 
in getting a person back to work at a wage that will be attractive to the 
individual and that will allow the agency to sever benefits. Obviously, 
since there are uncertainties, there are risks. Investments must be made 
today, but the return will not be forthcoming until some time in the 
future when and if the person returns to work. There is no guarantee of 
success, and the expenditures might be ineffective in putting the indi 
vidual back to work.
The other problem has to do with the financing of RTW services. 
Even if the beneficiary is convinced that the timing is right and that a 
particular set of services that can be purchased from a provider is just 
the ticket to get back to work, the person may lack the necessary 
financing. The proposals in part II suggest some ways to deal with the 
capital markets problem. SSA would not have the same financial diffi 
culties as the beneficiary since trust funds may be tapped to support 
these services. Although SSA has the advantage in the financing, the
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agency probably faces more severe informational hurdles than does the 
individual. SSA has the problems of selecting beneficiaries for whom 
RTW services may be effective and of deciding the type of services, 
the provider, the timing of the services, and a host of other issues. The 
individual beneficiaries may be in a far better position than SSA to 
assess personal motivation and the type of services and providers with 
which they will be comfortable.
However, the individual beneficiary's evaluation of future prospects 
may be distorted. Beneficiaries may overestimate the value of leisure 
or they may underestimate the labor market value of their residual 
functioning capacities. A more realistic notion of the jobs for which 
they might be eligible, after a period of counseling, guidance, and per 
haps even retraining, might emerge from a joint decision of the benefi 
ciary and a provider of RTW services. The recommendations in this 
paper are based on the assumption that competition among providers in 
offering plans, together with the freedom that the beneficiary has in 
choosing a plan will result in an optimal solution to the information 
problem.
The alternative, of course, would be for SSA to pick out the candi 
dates for RTW services or to offer these services to all. Offering and 
paying for rehabilitation services on an universal basis can be an 
expensive course of action, as demonstrated by the experience in work 
ers' compensation. The large increase in the number of private sector 
rehabilitation providers came about after California amended its work 
ers' compensation law to cover what might be termed mandatory reha 
bilitation. Although nothing in the law compelled employees to accept 
rehabilitation, employers and insurers were required to offer such ser 
vices upon application of employees. Rehabilitation services were 
accompanied by a continuation of benefits, and the appropriateness of 
rehabilitation became an issue in the legal struggles over the rights to 
compensation benefits. Originally forecast to range from 3 to 5 percent 
of benefit costs, the program outlays reached as high as 15 percent 
(Monroe Berkowitz 1990; California Workers' Compensation Institute 
1983). Variations of the mandatory rehabilitation provisions were 
enacted by several other states, including Colorado, Washington, Flor 
ida, and Maine. When the costs of the programs began to soar, each of 
these states abandoned the notion of compulsory rehabilitation.
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The problems with compulsory rehabilitation were not difficult to 
identify. Rehabilitation services became a matter of right and were 
viewed as an attractive additional form of aid and a way to prolong 
periods of compensation benefits. Providers were paid for services ren 
dered, be they evaluation services, counseling, training, or other types. 
Payment to the providers was not linked to results in the sense of return 
to work.
SSA's situation differs from that in workers' compensation, how 
ever. In the SSA programs, benefits are not a given for a finite period, 
and hence there would be less of a temptation for individuals to accept 
vocational rehabilitation just to prolong the period of benefits. On the 
other hand, the problems are similar, in that there are no obvious ways 
for the administrators to select persons for rehabilitation services. To 
make such services available to all brings with it expenses that may be 
out of proportion with the eventual benefits to the system.
Although states have abandoned mandatory rehabilitation or even 
mandatory evaluation for rehabilitation in workers' compensation, one 
legacy of that experience has been a thriving business of private sector 
rehabilitation providers. These individuals and firms are retained by 
employers and insurers to give services on demand. Since the employ 
ers are footing the bill, obviously these providers are called upon only 
when the employer or insurer makes a decision that the marginal dollar 
spent on services will yield a savings of that amount. It is doubtful that 
a public program such as SSA would be allowed to exercise these types 
of benefit-cost judgments in individual cases. Equity considerations 
would probably require uniform treatment of broad classes of benefi 
ciaries. The following scheme proposed for beneficiaries of the system 
takes advantage of the growing number of private sector rehabilitation 
providers and minimizes the discretion exercised by SSA in the selec 
tion of clients to be offered services.
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Part I: An Incentive-Based Reimbursement Scheme for SSA 
Disability Insurance Beneficiaries
The recommendations center around an incentive-based reimburse 
ment scheme that assumes no change in the current test for benefits eli 
gibility. It has two central features:
1. Payments to providers are conditioned on outcomes, with no nec 
essary relationship to the costs of services.
2. All risks are borne by providers.
The scheme can be outlined briefly. SSA certifies a broad range of pro 
viders from the public and private sectors. VR becomes one of the 
players but would compete with providers from the private sector and 
possibly other providers from the public sector, including employment 
services. The watchword here is diversity, and hopefully providers 
would cover a wide scope of philosophies and methodologies.
1. SSA would screen new beneficiaries and eliminate those persons 
with no reasonable chance of returning to work—the terminally 
ill or those with only a few remaining years of eligibility on the 
disability insurance (DI) rolls, and also those persons who are 
expected to recover and to leave the rolls without any RTW ser 
vices. All other beneficiaries would receive what can be termed a 
"ticket" or, to employ a term advocated by Steve Lavery from 
New Zealand, a "job card"6 that can be used to receive services at 
any of the providers.
2. The ticket would have no predetermined value. Once deposited 
by the beneficiary at a provider, the ticket would become a con 
tract between SSA and the provider to pay the latter a portion of 
the savings to the trust fund during the period of time that the 
beneficiary is off the rolls and at work.
3. The provider would not receive any compensation for services 
provided until the beneficiary completed the nine-month trial 
work period and was back at work for a period of time earning 
more than SGA. At that point, the provider would be paid a pre 
determined percentage of the amount that would have been paid
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in benefits had the beneficiary remained on the rolls.
4. Providers would be paid each year that the beneficiary remained 
off the rolls for all or a portion of the year, according to the 
amount of savings to the trust fund.
Rationale for a New Scheme
The basic justification for a new scheme is that the current system is 
"broke and needs fixing." In a world where private sector providers are 
playing an increasing role in other benefit programs, it seems unwise 
either to exclude them or to have them play a secondary role in this 
market. There does not appear to be any reason for allowing the private 
sector in only after the public sector rejects or ignores the case. 7
Beyond that, however, are the matters of monitoring and of provider 
incentives. Under the current system, providers bear the risk and are 
compensated only after the person leaves the rolls, and then solely for 
actual expenses incurred. Once the system begins to apply to private 
sector providers, SSA will have the unenviable task of auditing records 
and deciding issues of legitimacy of costs. Can fee schedules and utili 
zation protocols be far behind? All this may not be too much of a prob 
lem in the VR program since the expenses of the agency are met from 
general appropriations, and, in a sense, the SSA reimbursements are 
found money for the VR agency.
Under the proposed scheme, there will be no auditing or monitoring 
problems since payment is according to results and not according to 
the cost of services provided. This should be a plus for the proposed 
system since, as is abundantly clear from the reengineering studies, 
SSA has difficulties in accomplishing its main tasks in the DI program 
without the challenge of monitoring a rehabilitation program (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], SSA, September 
1994a and November 1994b).
The prime virtue of the proposed system is that it seeks to replicate 
as many of the features of the private market as is possible. The tickets 
are held by the beneficiaries, who have the option of depositing them 
with a wide variety of providers. The providers are assumed to range 
along a spectrum, from job developers to those oriented more to the 
professional goals of rehabilitation counselors.
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This scheme would appear to have many of the advantages of priva 
tization that Weaver (1991, 1994) has stressed. Beneficiaries would 
have a choice among many competing providers, with different ideas 
about how to restore the person to a job. Providers would have few of 
the present constraints on the freedom of the VR program to devise 
return-to-work plans. The VR program understandably is obliged to 
follow the current priorities established by Congress and to follow pre 
scribed procedures and processes. Adherence to the correct process 
may take precedence over outcomes.
Under the proposed scheme, the beneficiary is given a great deal of 
discretion. There is no obligation to deposit the ticket with any pro 
vider. The individual may choose to hold onto the ticket, preferring 
benefits to undergoing any regimen of rehabilitation. No mandatory 
compliance is contemplated. If, however, providers know that a partic 
ular person has a ticket, they will do all they can to persuade or cajole 
the person to deposit the ticket with them, and such competition for the 
custom of the beneficiary is all to the good.
The opposite situation may also prevail: no provider may agree to 
accept the ticket of a particular beneficiary. There may not be any pro 
vider who believes that the risk is worthwhile, that the person can be 
made job ready within the constraints of the reimbursement formula. 
Again, this would be an acceptable outcome. It would be a market 
judgment that the case cannot be handled at a profit to the provider.
Some Problem Areas
Who Should Be Issued Tickets?
One solution is simply to issue tickets to all beneficiaries. Persons 
who are terminally ill would not be in a position to deposit the tickets, 
and they probably would not be accepted once their condition was 
known. Older persons within a few years of age 65 might also have lit 
tle motivation to deposit the tickets, and providers would be reluctant 
to accept them in light of the limited number of years remaining in 
which payments could be collected. The problem may solve itself, and 
there may be no good reason for SSA to try to sort out these groups. 
However, it would always be possible for SSA to write the rules so as 
to deny tickets to those over a particular age or with diagnoses where
340 Improving the Return to Work of Social Security Disability Beneficiaries
death is expected within a short period of time. An alternative would be 
to issue tickets to persons in this group only on request.
A thornier problem is posed by those individuals who are expected 
to recover and leave the rolls without any services. Allowing these per 
sons to have tickets will lead to accusations of "creaming" on the part 
of providers: the latter would only have to secure the tickets and retain 
them until the person went to work—and then claim the rewards. On 
the other hand, this is a difficult group to identify with any degree of 
certainty. Rather than expending the time and energy on identification, 
the strategy would be to issue tickets and to let the providers gain the 
benefits that might counterbalance some of the extraordinary costs 
involved in the more difficult cases. In all instances, the most that SSA 
would be paying would be a portion of the amounts spent had the per 
son remained on the rolls.
In spite of the argument that no monetary losses accrue to SSA, per 
ceptions are important in these matters. Therefore, SSA should try to 
identify a group that is likely to exit the rolls without services. Elimi 
nating that contingent would allow the providers to prioritize services 
to those who have tickets and would keep them from "creaming" in the 
primal sense of giving assistance to persons who otherwise would have 
reached the same result.
What Happens if There Is a Change of Providers?
Two situations might be distinguished. One is where the beneficiary 
is dissatisfied with the provider, and the other is where the provider is 
unhappy with the beneficiary. The latter situation would seem to pose 
few problems. The provider can simply return the ticket to the benefi 
ciary, or, if possible, sell it to another provider. There should be no 
objection to a market developing in these tickets.
The more difficult situation is where the beneficiary refuses to have 
anything more to do with the provider. In that case, the provider might 
still be able to sell the ticket to another provider. The ticket would be 
worth little to the former if the beneficiary has announced that no 
return to work is feasible until the original provider is off the case. An 
alternative to writing detailed rules and regulations and deciding subse 
quent disputes, would be to leave such matters to the negotiations 
between all of the parties, including more than one provider.
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Inevitably some conflicts will arise, and it would seem to be reason 
able to write legislation authorizing another mechanism to resolve such 
matters. One possibility would be final and binding arbitration with 
provisions for an expedited hearing.
What Is the Size of the Market?
An estimated 200,000 persons per year would realistically be in the 
market for RTW services. This number is based on the fact that 
629,700 awards were made in 1993 (HHS, SSA 1994a, table 6.C1). If 
we eliminate all those over 50 years of age (316,669 persons) and those 
who are terminally ill (93,953 persons), we have 219,078 individuals 
remaining. Possibly 12 percent of the last number might be expected to 
recover and exit the rolls without assistance, which would leave 
192,789 or roughly 200,000 persons to be issued tickets. Obviously, 
the number would be three times as great if everyone coming on the 
rolls were issued the tickets, but it is likely that there would be some 
reluctance on the part of SSA to issue tickets to those persons who 
were expected to leave the rolls without services. In addition, the older 
and sicker group would not be very attractive to providers.
How Will Providers Be Reimbursed?
The essence of the proposal is that providers are to be paid based on 
results as they become known. It is contemplated that the providers 
would expend the funds for services or find some other agency or body 
to finance them. The providers would not be reimbursed until such time 
as the person left the rolls, after which the provider would be paid a 
percentage of the benefit amount for the period the person was off the 
rolls. Such a calculation would be done yearly, and the provider com 
pensated accordingly. Thus, the provider would have the incentive not 
only to return the person to work but to keep the person at work. 8
A question can be raised as to whether the provider should be paid 
in the event the beneficiary medically recovers but does not return to 
work. In my view, payment should be conditioned not only on removal 
from the rolls, but on return to work. The provider can be seen as an 
advocate for the beneficiary, and it would seem problematic to have 
providers striving to prove to SSA that a medical recovery has 
occurred, without having the burden of placing and keeping the person
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in a job that paid more than the SGA level. Thus, the proposed scheme 
would reimburse the provider only in the event of a return to work.
Table 1 illustrates how this reimbursement might work. The monthly 
benefit shown is the average amount awarded to a person of that age 
with a single dependent. The provider is assumed to be paid 30 percent 
of the annual savings. This is an arbitrary percentage that could vary 
and eventually would have to be set in negotiations between SSA and 
the providers.



































SOURCE HHS, SSA (1993a) and author's calculations
a Annual benefit amount is based on the average benefit to a person of the age indicated, as shown 
in the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin (HHS, SSA 1993a, p 178), 
plus one-half of that amount for one dependent
b. The recipient may be on the DI rolls until age 65 One year is subtracted to account for the nine- 
month trial work period plus three months
c Present value of payments to providers was calculated assuming a 6 percent discount rate and 
annual compounding.
The reimbursement to the providers would be on a year-to-year 
basis. However, it is useful to calculate the present value of these pay 
ments so that providers can have some criterion for deciding how much 
should be spent in an individual case. 9 In making these present value 
calculations, the assumption is that the person remains on the rolls 
until age 65, unless death occurs previously. The calculations, in addi 
tion to taking mortality into account, make an adjustment for inflation 
and the fact that, under the most optimistic of assumptions, it would 
take at least a year before the person would leave the rolls. That 
amount of time is due to the nine-month trial work period plus the
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three-month period before a person is taken off the rolls. The present 
value figure is a maximum amount that could be paid under the 30 per 
cent sharing assumption. It is difficult to estimate the cost to the pro 
viders of the services necessary to remove the person from the rolls. 
Under the VR program, the average cost per case has been running 
about $10,000. A return of three to four times that amount is probably 
not excessive, considering that the payment is available only for suc 
cesses. The provider would be paid nothing if the person never left the 
rolls. 10
Part II: An Incentive-Based Proposal for SSA Disability Insurance 
Applicants and Beneficiaries
There are obvious advantages in providing RTW services before the 
benefits eligibility decision is made. One advantage is timing (Gardner 
1988). The sooner the person is reached, the better the chances that ser 
vices will be effective. The question is whether the whole spirit and 
ethos of the decision-making process in SSA might be changed so that 
rehabilitation or return to work takes precedence over benefits.
The SSA DI program bears the stamp of its origins. Unlike the situ 
ation in some countries, DI did not begin as an offshoot of the health 
program but as an addition to the retirement program. The concern was 
for persons whose income had stopped due to a disability. They were 
forced to "retire" due to a medical condition, and the feeling was that 
they should have somewhat the same benefits as people who retired 
due to old age.
The emphasis of SSA has been on the increasingly difficult task of 
determining who is and who is not eligible for benefits, in spite of the 
location of the determination process in the state agencies linked to the 
VR program, and in spite of the cooperative efforts through the years 
of the Beneficiary Rehabilitation Program (Monroe Berkowitz et al. 
1982) and the current VR program. Rehabilitation has not come before 
benefits. It has been the other way around.
A policy such as the German one of placing "rehabilitation before 
pensions" (Aarts and de long, this volume) is not easy to bring about. 
New Zealand, for example, has changed the name of its basic accident
344 Improving the Return to Work of Social Security Disability Beneficiaries
statute from the Accident Compensation Act to the Accident Rehabili 
tation and Compensation Insurance Act, but there is no real evidence 
that the new name has been accompanied by different priorities. 
Changing from an agency whose primary task is to determine which 
applicants should be paid cash disability benefits to one whose first 
interest is the return to work of applicants is not only difficult but prob 
ably requires modifications in support systems and other legislation.
One possible approach would be to charge the Disability Determina 
tion Services (DDS) with the responsibility of making a rehabilitation 
decision before making the basic one dealing with eligibility for bene 
fits. The initial decision would be whether the applicant should or 
should not receive a "ticket," "job card," or simply a "voucher" for 
rehabilitation services. After that choice is made, the DDS would pro 
ceed to considering the matter of eligibility for benefits. Some applica 
tions would be allowed and others denied, without regard to whether 
the individuals were issued vouchers.
The test for the voucher could be essentially that now specified for 
acceptance into the general state-federal VR program. First, it must be 
established that the person has a physical or mental condition that con 
stitutes a substantial handicap to employment for this individual; sec 
ond, there must be a reasonable expectation that vocational 
rehabilitation services will benefit the individual's employ ability.
Just as the DDS may now call on testimony from medical experts in 
deciding whether to allow benefits, it may also call upon expert evalua- 
tors for advice regarding the benefits of vocational rehabilitation ser 
vices for the individual's employment chances. 11 There are many 
different ways that the DDS might classify an individual's vocational 
rehabilitation potential. The simplest approach would probably be to 
place all applicants into three categories.
The first category would be those persons who are deemed not to 
have a physical or mental condition that would interfere with their 
employment. These people would be expected to return to the labor 
market without any VR services. Although the determination of vouch 
ers and the determination of benefits would be done separately, pre 
sumably all of the persons in this category would end up in the group 
denied benefits.
The persons in the second category would be those who meet the 
eligibility requirements and who would be issued vouchers. SSA bene-
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fits would later be allowed for some of these individuals and would be 
denied for others.
In the third category would be those persons with a sufficiently dis 
abling physical or mental condition but who are so severely impaired 
that the judgment is made that they would not benefit from receiving 
VR services. The presumption is that most of these individuals would 
be allowed disability insurance payments, but some may not be able to 
meet the rigorous disability tests in the DI law.
In a second stage, the DDS would move to consider the applications 
on their merits. Persons in the first category presumably end up without 
vouchers and without benefits. It is anticipated that benefits would be 
allowed to persons in the third category who were denied vouchers 
based on the severity of their conditions and the poor outlook for 
employment. It is people in the middle category who pose the interest 
ing issues. Some of these individuals might be denied outright, due to 
not meeting the existing SSA eligibility tests; however, they would still 
have their vouchers. This presents two problems. One is that, if we still 
wish to keep an incentive-based system for providers, we no longer 
have any obvious yardsticks with which to measure the compensation 
due providers who successfully find jobs for people in this group. The 
second problem is that there is no obvious source of financing for the 
RTW expenses. It is doubtful that there is any rationale for tapping 
trust funds on behalf of persons who have been denied benefits.
Financing Vouchers from a Loan Fund
One possible solution to the financing problem is to have Congress 
establish a loan fund from general revenues. The risks would be limited 
by the finite amount of the fund, which would be replenished by the 
repayment of the loans. Loans would be available at minimal rates of 
interest, and the obligation to repay would begin only when and if the 
person returned to gainful employment. Obviously, "failures" would 
result in a rapid depletion of the fund.
The fund could be used for two purposes. One would be to provide, 
where necessary, a modest living allowance for the person who might 
be without necessary support, having been denied SSA benefits. The 
other would be to reimburse the provider of RTW services. In order to 
adhere to the incentive- or performance-based philosophy, the provider
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would not be paid unless and until the person returned to work and 
remained at work for a period of time. A minimum period of six 
months would be advisable.
Another issue has to do with the value of the voucher. Obviously, the 
higher the value, the more attractive it will be to providers, who are 
being asked to bear the risks of the RTW program. On the other hand, 
the value of the voucher will have to depend on the size of the fund. 
Since this proposal is not for an open-ended entitlement system, the 
fund will have a finite amount of money available to finance RTW pro 
grams. The generosity of the voucher might well fluctuate in accor 
dance with fund balances.
There appears to be no ideal way to set the value of the voucher, but 
solutions might come from some experimentation over time. One 
approach would be to determine if the fund administrator, the DDS, or 
another appropriate body could make distinctions among applicants, 
based on the probability of their returning to work or on the forecast of 
the necessary services that would enable them to get back to work. 
Another experiment would focus less on the diagnosis of the individual 
and more on simulations, which would take into account fund balances 
and the attractiveness to providers of vouchers with values differing for 
persons in different disability categories.
Time-Limited Benefits
The other contingent of those persons issued vouchers would be 
individuals who qualified for benefits under the present definitions of 
disability. This group could be treated in the same way as proposed 
earlier for beneficiaries who would be issued tickets. However, in order 
to emphasize the philosophy of rehabilitation first and benefits second, 
the concept of time-limited benefits should be introduced. In a sense, 
any case that is recorded for a continuing disability review (CDR) is 
time limited. However, due to the press of other business, CDRs have 
not been conducted on a regular basis. A time-limited benefit would be 
different: recipients would be alerted to the fact that they are expected 
to return to the labor market and that their benefits are given to them 
for a finite period of time.
At the outset, a period of two years should be sufficiently long to 
determine whether RTW services were effective in getting the person
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back to work. After the two-year period, benefits would automatically 
cease. If the person were not at work, a new application could be filed, 
with the understanding that, in addition to the usual tests of disability, 
SSA would take into account the record of cooperation of the applicant 
with the RTW services. In all other respects, the incentive-based 
scheme for beneficiaries that has been proposed would apply.
An Incentive-Based Proposal for Supplemental Security Income
It might be misleading to label this an RTW process since some of 
the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) clients may not have had any 
work experience. However, the problems are essentially the same, and 
an incentive-based proposal, as in part I would seem to be as applicable 
to SSI as to DI.
Certainly, there are also differences that need to be considered. First, 
in the case of DI, the test is the inability to work, whereas, in SSI, there 
is not only this criterion, but a test based on assets and income. Second, 
the conditions for entering the SSI rolls are not the same as the condi 
tions for exiting from the rolls. Although there is talk about additional 
employment incentive provisions for DI, in the form of allowing the 
recipient to retain a portion of benefits while working, these rules are 
not yet in effect. Such incentives, plus a host of others, are in place for 
SSI recipients (HHS, SSA 1992, Red Book on Work Incentives). These 
provisions pose no real problems, although their existence does dimin 
ish the savings to government when a recipient goes to work. Of 
course, SSI is financed on a different basis than is DI. There is no trust 
fund for SSI, and payments are from general revenues.
In principle, the issues and procedures applicable to DI can be trans 
ferred to SSI. As in the case of DI, decisions would have to be made as 
to whether tickets would be issued to all SSI recipients at the time they 
are put on the benefit rolls, or whether tickets ought to be withheld 
from those too disabled, too old, and those expected to recover without 
the need for services.
It would be necessary to estimate the savings to the taxpayer if the 
person who has qualified for SSI is removed from the rolls. Such a cal 
culation is currently made in order to evaluate the maximum amounts
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that could be paid to VR in the case of rehabilitation of an SSI benefi 
ciary. These estimates would be used, and a percentage of the savings 
would determine the value of the ticket.
Successful providers might have to be paid a different percentage of 
savings than would be true in the case of DI beneficiaries. Thirty per 
cent may not be sufficient in the situation where the recipient is 
allowed to retain one dollar of benefits for every two dollars of earn 
ings. The exact percentage should be set after a more thorough exami 
nation of the projected savings.
Conclusions
The current system designed to return disabled beneficiaries to work 
desperately needs to be changed. SSA is assumed to have its hands full 
trying to make the disability determination process work in an equita 
ble and efficient manner and to have neither the expertise nor the 
financing to engage in the day-to-day management of the rehabilitation 
of its beneficiaries. At the same time, the return to work of persons on 
the rolls is assumed to be a responsibility of SSA.
Another important assumption is that no one formula, modality, or 
type of rehabilitation service is obviously superior to another when it 
comes to returning beneficiaries to work. Problems of what service to 
be used, when it should be used, and who should provide the service 
are best left to the market, where the individual preferences of benefi 
ciaries can be matched with the different approaches of providers.
This paper advances several proposals for reform of the RTW sys 
tem. In part I, the proposal pertains only to beneficiaries and requires 
no change in the present definitions of disability. The beneficiary 
would be provided with a ticket that could be used to obtain services 
from a wide variety of providers. Coming up with a set of services and 
the conditions for the administration of these services would be left to 
the interaction of the beneficiaries and the providers. In the absence of 
a market, the proposed system would have some of the advantages of a 
market.
Payments to providers would be based on results. If the beneficiary 
does not return to work, no payments would be due. The risk would be
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borne entirely by the provider, whose incentive to get into this business 
would be based on the generosity of the amounts received if the benefi 
ciary resumes employment. The experience of the DI program is that 
persons move off and on the rolls. The system of compensation pro 
posed here, where providers are paid on a yearly basis only so long as 
the person is off the rolls, guarantees that the providers will have con 
tinued interest in monitoring the employment of persons returned to 
work.
SSA has nothing to lose from this system, in the sense that the 
agency can never pay providers more than a fraction of the savings 
accruing to the trust fund, and this would occur only after evidence is 
received that the savings have been realized. In this sense, the new sys 
tem should not cost the agency any additional money. However, it is 
necessary to take into account any induced demand for benefits 
brought about by the increased payments to providers. The benefits 
package may now be more attractive to some persons who now would 
file for benefits. These costs are difficult to estimate but it is wise to 
assume that some additional costs would occur because of the induced 
demand.
For the system to work, providers have to be attracted to it and be 
willing to finance back-to-work programs on this contingency basis. 
Congress has to be convinced that providers should be paid amounts 
that have no necessary relationship to the cost of services provided.
Part II proposals are based on changes in the way that SSA adminis 
ters the disability programs. Although the difficulties in bringing about 
fundamental change are not underestimated, the success of the part II 
proposals depends on SSA placing rehabilitation first and benefit 
awards second. Persons should be evaluated initially for suitability for 
RTW services, and those found suitable should be issued vouchers that 
are essentially claims on a loan fund. For those persons who are denied 
benefits, the value of the voucher would be determined by experiments. 
It is proposed that the funds be used for income support as well as for 
RTW services.
The incentive-based aspects of the RTW proposals for beneficiaries 
are maintained in part II, albeit in a modified form. For persons with 
vouchers who are allowed benefits, the proposed system should oper 
ate in much the same manner as in part I for beneficiaries, except that 
the benefits should be awarded on a two-year, time-limited basis.
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The SSI program poses its own problems, stemming from the lack 
of an identifiable trust fund and the SSI incentive provisions that allow 
persons who are working to retain a portion of their earnings. The 
incentive-based scheme for beneficiaries (part I) should be applied to 
the SSI program, with appropriate modifications in the reimbursement 
formula for providers.
Change never comes easily to an established governmental program, 
nor should it. Each innovation ought to bear the burden of proving that 
it will bring benefits commensurate with its costs. Yet the RTW record 
cries out for reform. In keeping with the philosophy of the 1990s, this 
change ought to be one that does not create new open-ended entitle 
ment programs or call upon the bureaucracy to accomplish tasks for 
which it is ill suited. In each of the schemes proposed in this paper, risk 
is transferred to the providers, payments are made only when results 
are evident, and a positive marginal benefit-cost ratio is guaranteed.
NOTES
1. The state Disability Determination Service (DDS) sends a list of beneficiaries and denied 
applicants who are considered to have rehabilitation potential to the state VR agencies These 
agencies may or may not contact the individual, who may or may not apply for services (Reno and 
staff 1994)
2 If asked by the applicant, personnel at the SSA district offices are instructed to tell claim 
ants about the VR program and to give them a brochure with the address and phone number of the 
local VR agency. A brochure giving an overview of state VR services was last printed by SSA in 
1981 and has been out of print for many years (Reno and staff 1994)
3. A more complete explanation of how the process works in the joint federal-state vocational 
rehabilitation program can be found m Mandeville and Brabham 1992 The VR program is based 
on legislation that began in the 1920s. A summary look at the chronology of this legislation can be 
found in Jenkins, Patterson, and Szymanski 1992, table 1 2 For a broader historical examination 
of the VR program, see Edward Berkowitz 1987.
4. Our discussion is narrowly focused on VR activity A study by Hennessey and Dykacz 
(1993) of a 1972 cohort of beneficiaries projected that 11 percent of the individuals would have 
either a medical or a work recovery, 36 percent would die, and 53 percent would have their bene 
fits converted to retired-worker status at age 65 Of course, all beneficiaries will die eventually, 
the reference here is to the first event of interest after entitlement
5. These data are from unpublished tabulations from the Rehabilitation Services Administra 
tion, May 1994, and are cited in Reno and staff 1994
6. Lavery 1994. The advantage of the job card is that it can be encoded with information that 
might be used to differentiate potential rehabilitants, or, as Lavery would refer to such persons, 
"customers," in terms of the reimbursement formulas or other characteristics.
7 The preferential status granted the VR program is embodied in the law. However, section 
222(d)(2) of the Social Security Act allows the Commissioner of Social Security to contract with 
other public or private agencies where a state is unwilling to participate or where it does not have
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a suitable plan. By reason of these provisions, SSA will be contracting with private providers 
where the state VR chooses not to serve the person if and when detailed regulations are issued
8 Keeping persons at work or off the rolls is a problem. In their examination of a 1972 cohort 
of beneficiaries, Hennessey and Dykacz (1993, p. 59) show that about 43 percent of those benefi 
ciaries who recovered ended their post-recovery period by becoming reentitled to disabled worker 
benefits.
9 Present value calculations are obviously sensitive to assumptions about trends in benefit 
amounts, termination rates, rates of discount, and a number of other factors For purposes of com 
pensating VR where reimbursement cannot exceed savings to the trust fund, the SSA actuaries 
compute these present values. The following table presents the application of their formula to per 
sons with the assumed benefits as shown. These sums are a good bit lower than the present-value 
sums in table 1. Unlike the VR arrangements, the reimbursements under the proposed scheme 
would be on a year-to-year basis Since it is contemplated that these reimbursements would 
always be merely a fraction of the yearly savings and would be paid only after these savings 
accrue, there would be no possibility of a payment to the providers greater than the savings to the 
trust fund.
SSA Computation of Present Value of Program Savings from Successful Rehabilitation 
Age Monthly benefit8 Computation of savings0
25 $407 $47,11802 
35 $547 $66,61027 
45 $651 $68,985378
________50_______________$663_____________$61,887.88_____ 
a Monthly benefit amount is based on the average benefit to a person of the age without dependents as mandated 
in the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin (HHS, SSA 1993a, p 178) 
b The formula for total savings to the SSA is as follows "A-Factor" +[(PIA-WC+SSI)* "B-Factor"], where the 
"A-Factor" represents savings resulting from administrative costs, and the "B-Factor" represents savings resulting 
from the expected eventual termination of benefit payments PIA = Title II Primary Insurance Amount, WC = 
Workers' Compensation payment, and SSI = Supplemental Security Income payments Tables of A and B factors 
are based on the alternative IIB set of disability, economic, and health utilization assumptions found in the 1988 
SSA Trustees' Reports
10 In a meeting of private providers held on June 26, 1994, the basic outlines of the proposal 
were covered. Some providers expressed doubts that the program would be a viable one and were 
concerned about having to finance the services over what might be long periods of time before 
any returns would be received. Other providers thought the program offered opportunities and felt 
that it could be financed by recourse to bank loans or to the equities market. Before such a pro 
gram is put into effect, it would be desirable to review concrete business plans from some of the 
providers who feel that the proposal would be attractive to them.
11 Evaluation for vocational rehabilitation feasibility is a difficult matter If the DOS offices 
use a cadre of evaluators to decide who is and who is not a suitable candidate, it would be desir 
able to separate this function from the provision of RTW services in order to avoid any conflict of 
interests.
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